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Summary findings
In an earlier  paper (Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Private  bus operators  in Brazil  are generally
1546), Rebelo  and Benevenuto  described  a pioneer  traditional  entrepreneurs.  They must be taught how to
initiative  of Sao  Paulo's municipal  and state  prepare financing  plans or at least to get the best advice
governments,  to give  the private  sector a concession  on  about putting together a project's  financial  engineering
building  and operating  a number  of "trunk" busways.  At  design.  In this case,  all consortia  turned to BNDES  for
the time, the Sao  Paulo Municipal  Government  had  financing,  probably  because  their loan interest  rates were
already  awarded  a number  of busway  corridors  to private  lower  than those of commercial  banks  but also  because
consortia,  although  the consortia  had yet to get the  the concession  was with the government.  They  did not
financing  needed to implement  the investment  plan. On  consider  other options such as the International  Finance
the other hand, the state had not yet awarded  its first  Corporation or other private-sector-related  development
corridor and was still  adjusting  the bidding  documents  institutions.
based on comments  received  from interested  parties.  * The Sao  Paulo municipality  should also  have
In this paper, Rebelo  and Benevenuto  describe  what  undertaken  detailed  economic  evaluation  of the projects,
happened since  then and draw lessons  for the future.  from the standpoint  of the region  as a whole,  including
After a long, successful  bidding  process,  this  the impact  on other modes  of transportation  and on
imaginative  and pioneering  program  launched  by the  systems  integration.  Such  analysis  is required  by all
municipality  failed  to materialize  because  of problems  in  bilateral  and multilateral  development  institutions,
getting  financing.  Possibly  the market  felt that the risks  including  BNDES,  a national development  bank.
involved  in building  and operating  the system  *  When private  operators  are paid for vehicle-
outweighed  the benefits  and that the Sao  Paulo  and  kilometer  supplied  and when the state collects  all
Brazilian  market  was not yet prepared  to accept  such a  revenues  and then pays  the operators,  concession
challenge  without better partial risk  guarantees.  The state  contracts  or operating  revenues  cannot be easily  used as
learned  from the mistakes  of the municipality  and was  guarantees.  Before  defining  tariff mechanisms,
successful  in the concession  of the Sao  Mateus-Jabaquara  governments  should think through the impacts  they
corridor.  might  have  on financing,  since  the revenues  collected  are
Among  the lessons  learned from this project:  often  the best  guarantee  that can be offered.
This  paper-  ajoint  product  of the Finance,  Private  Sector,  and  Infrastructure  Department  and  the Brazil  Department,  Latin
America  and the Caribbean  Region  - is part of a larger  effort in the region to promote  concessions  in urban transport.
Copies  of the paper are available  free from the World Bank,  1818 H Street  NW, Washington,  DC 20433. Please  contact
Allison  Turner, room 19-138,  telephone  202- 473-0933, fax 202-676-9594,  Internet address  aturner@worldbank.org.
December  1997. (17 pages)
The Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  disseminates  the findings  of work in progress  to encourage  the exchange  of ideas  about
development  issues.  An objective  of the  series  is to get  the findings  out quickly,  even  if the presentations  are  less  than  fully polished.  The
papers  carry  the  names  of the  authors  and should  be cited accordingly.  The findings,  interpretations,  and conclusions  expressed  in this
paper  are entirely  those  of the authors.  They do not necessarily  represent  the view of the World  Bank,  its Executive  Directors,  or the
countries  they represent.
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Jorge  Rebelo
Pedro BenvenutoIBy Jorge Rebelo and Pedro Beni'enutol
1.  In the paper  entitled "Concessions of Busways to the Private Sector - The Sao
Paulo Metropolitan Region Experience" of this  Policy Research Working Series (#1546),
we described in detail a pioneer initiative of the Municipal and State Governments of Sao
Paulo, to concession out to the private sector the construction and operations of a number
of  "trunk"  busways.  At  the  time  we  wrote  the  article,  the  Sao  Paulo  Municipal
government had  already awarded a  number of the busway corridors  to  private sector
consortia.  The  consortia,  however,  would  have  to  obtain  the  financing required  to
implement the investment plan. The State, on the other hand, had not yet awarded its first
corridor and was still adjusting the bidding documents based on the comments received
from the interested parties. In this paper we describe what happened since then and we
draw lessons for the future.
The  Municipality  Busway Program:
2.  Table 1 gives a description of the busway corridors awarded by the Municipality.
Before we look at the results of this program we review quickly the main objectives of the
program and how the bidding process was undertaken.
3.  Objective . The objective of the program was to create a structural network of
integrated busways designed to substantially  improve the level of service provided to bus
users  and to  reduce  the operating and management costs as  compared to  traditional
operations by using the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) concept.
4.  The basic philosophy of this program was to  rationalize the existing network of
regular public and private bus services, by creating 15 exclusive busways with  a total
length of 241km. The exclusive busways would require a special treatment  of the road
space insofar as the pavement is concerned, bus stops, horizontal and vertical signing, and
traffic lights to allow a substantial reduction in bus travel times.
5.  The bus stops had an average spacing of 500 meters, the minimum to guarantee
the fluidity of the bus traffic and the automobile traffic in general.  It  also included bus
stops with fixed pavement and ramps with the appropriate gradient to be  used by the
I Jorge  Rebelo  is a Principal  Transport  Specialist  in the  Latin  America  Region  of  the World  Bank  and
Pedro  Benvenuto  is a Senior  Advisor  of  the Sao  Paulo  Metro  Company.  The  authors  are gratefil  to
Messrs.  Francisco  Christovam  (President  of the  Sgo  Paulo  Transporte  S.A.-SP  Trans),  Pedro  Luiz  de Brito
Machado  (Superintendent  of  Development  of the  Empresa  Metropolitana  de Transportes  Urbanos  de Sao
Paulo  S/A-EMTU/SP)  and  Dalmo  dos  Santos  Marchetti  (Advisor  to the  Manager  of  Infrastructure
Projects  of  the  Banco  Nacional  de Desenvolvimento  Econ6mico-  BNDES)physically disadvantaged, as well as  to  allow for  the  simultaneous operation  of  two
articulated buses.
6.  The  operational  system  for  these  exclusive busways  was  designed as  trunk-
busways. In these corridors, the trunk-lines, operations were carried out by smaller fleets
of high capacity articulated buses, normally originating in a transfer terminal located at the
beginning of the corridor. Outside the corridor, the operation was carried out by feeder
bus lines on conventional busways starting in the periphery and serving the terminals and
transfer stations along the corridor, guaranteeing physical and tariff integration.
CORRIDORS AND CONSORTIA TO WHICH THEY WERE AWARDED IN THE SAO PAULO
MUNICIPALITY  PROGRAM
CORRIDOR  WINNING CONSORTIA  KM  FLEET
Anhaia Mello -Sapopemba - TRANSBUS  36,6  180
D. Pedro
Assis Ribeiro -Carvalho Pinto  CAMARGO  38,0  150
CAMPOS/BADRA
Francisco Morato  ENTERPA  16,2  90
Radial Leste  18,2  50
Rio Bonito-Guarapiranga  COWANNSA  42,8  33
Guaianases  ENGEFOR/NAKANO  24,9  30
Sabari  COWANNSA  9,2  50
Ibirapuera  1BIRAPUERA  16,3  213
Pirituba-Sao Joao-Inajar de Souza  JARAGUA  24,0  230
|  Santo Amaro (Reforma)  COWANNSA  14,5  30
7.  The exclusive busways were designed as to function with continuous monitoring to
assure service reliability.  Bus priority at the intersections in relation to the other
automobile traffic was also assured,  especially  at crossings, through a traffic light system
regulated to increase the fluidity of bus traffic. The buses were equipped with
communication equipment which allowed them to be controlled by a Central Operational
Control Center.
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;  rfsS°p  21015  w  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~8.  Articulated and bi-articulated buses would be used, with doors on both sides (the ones
in the left side of the vehicle at the ground level, to allow for the loading of passengers at
the terminals and bus stops through platforms) and equipped with electronic system for
validation and control of tickets.
Results of the bidding process
9.  The  Sao Paulo  Municipality undertook  with  success the  bidding process  (with  a
technical and price proposals) which culminated in the award and signing of contracts with
several consortia  (see  Table  1) for the  implementation of  the works  agreed  and the
operation of the system for a period of 8 years.
10.  The consortia which were selected had the obligation of preparing the engineering
designs, build and maintain the roadway, the terminals, the transfer stations, the traffic
signalling,  the landscape and to operate the vehicle sets.
11.  The  Municipal Government had the obligation to pay the Consortia in two parts:
one to  amortize  the  infrastructure investments and  the  other to  compensate for  the
operating costs.
12.  The remuneration of the infrastructure investments was based in the proposal of
each winning bidder, and reflected the net present value of the investment costs. In the
analysis of the bids, these costs were  evaluated against the solutions proposed for  the
corridor and compared with a preliminary budget prepared by the State based on the most
likely physical and operational situation of each link under analysis.
13.  The remuneration  of  operating  costs was  established through  a  spreadsheet
included in the bidding documents, based on the payment of a fixed value estimated by a
formula which takes into account the kilometers travelled by the fleet and the number of
passengers transported.
14.  After  the signing of the  contracts with  the Municipality, the  Consortia had to
complete the Project Funding of their proposals, and were led to believe that they would
be  able  to  do  so  mainly  through  financing  of  the  National  Economic  and  Social
Development Bank  of Brazil (BNDES)  a federally owned  development Bank.  They
could, however, search for their financing from other sources.
Lessons learned
15. After this long and successful bidding process, this very imaginative  and pioneering
program for busway concessions launched by the Sao Paulo Municipality has not been
implemented. After the corridors had been awarded to the several private consortia which
bid for them, there were problems in securing the required financing. Because the
program was not only innovative but a very convincing way of postponing public
investment by drawing on private sector funds, it is important to draw some lessons from
this experience and attempt to see why the program has failed. In the next paragraphs we
describe the main reasons for the failure of the program by reviewing what the three main
4actors in this "program"  did or should  have done:  a) the private  sector consortia  who won
the contracts;  b) the municipal  government;  and c) the credit  agencies.
16.  The private  sector consortia
*  All  of the winners  sought  financing  from  the same  bank,  the Brazilian  National
Social  Development  Bank (BNDES).  None of the consortia  looked  for other
sources  of financing  such  as Commercial  banks,  the International  Finance
Corporation  or even  one of the multilateral  investment  Banks  (IBRD  or IDB)
which  could offer  partial  risk guarantees  for loans  the consortia  could  obtain
from commercial  banks.
*  The winning  consortia  were not established  with a long-term  perspective  of
exploration  of the market.  Instead,  the civil  works contractors  were strictly
interested  in the short  term, mainly  in the implementation  of the infrastructure
works, and  the traditional  bus operators  of regular  lines  confined  their interest
to maintaining  the provision  of services.
*  There was no incentive  for exploring the options  available  in non-tariff
revenue  market  (this was very marginally  treated  in the bidding  documents).
These  revenues  could,  in a way, lower  the investments  to be repaid by the
Municipality.
*  Although  all the winners  made  a substantial  effort  to secure  the contracts  by
presenting  very imaginative  engineering  and operational  proposals,  they
relegated  to a second  place  the financing  aspects  of the contracts.  In fact, after
not having  much  success  in their attempts  to seek financing  from the BNDES,
the private  entrepeneurs  started  to put pressure  to transform  the BOT
contracts  into ordinary  works paid  by quantity  of works completed.  So, they
wanted  to revert to traditional  finnacing  methods
17.  From  the above  we may  conclude  that, given  the lack of knowledge  about
financing  alternatives  and a mindset  which  still  sees  the public  sector as the main  provider
of funds,  the entrepeneurs  gave  up very easily.  It is necessary  to teach  to  the entrepeneurs
alternative  financing  mechanisms  and publicize  ways  by which  they can access  other
national  and international  sources  of financing.
18.  Municipal  Government
*  Despite  its drive  to innovate  and to seek private  financing  to undertake
investments  which  could not be timely  financed  by public  funds  due to
budgetary  restrictions,  the Sao  Paulo  Municipality  should  have  been  less
optimistic  in its assumptions  about the capacity  and  willingness  of the private
sector  to come  up with the required  funds.
*  Sao Paulo  Municipality  (SPM)  should  have  also assumed  a flexible  stance  in
its bidding  documents  by trying  to allow  some  space  to negotiate  unforeseen
5events rather than being worried with transforming the contracts in
instruments to monitor and discipline  the  winners. For example, there should
have been provisions to provide guarantees for  the financing of the operators
by commercial banks. In fact, SPM ended up creating such a facility  but it was
an afterthought and was not sufficient to appease the banks.
19.  The Sao Paulo Municipality, being the biggest municipality  in the SPMR, should
have undertaken a detailed economic analysis  from the standpoint of the SPMR, taking
into account the effect of the proposed system on other modes, rather than doing just a
financial  analysis. Being a development organization, BNDES was certainly sensitive to
the modal impacts of the system on the SPMR. It  seems that the Sao Paulo Municipality
analysis  was very strong from an engineering and environmental standpoint but did not
have the same rigor in terms of economic and financial analysis.
20.  Financial lending institutions
*  BNDES apparently examined  the requests for financing  but arrived at the
conclusion that, from an economic (and not from a financial standpoint) the
proposed corridors were not viable. Being above all a national economic
development Bank,  BNDES is primarily interested on the economic rate of
return of the projects rather then a financial rate of return. BNDES also found
that the original analysis  that led to the design of the corridors was flawed and
did not take into account the effect on other modes, mainly rail based modes,
in some cases proposing trunk bus lines  where subway lines were planned.
Furthermore, BNDES found some of the projects rather expensive.
- Insofar as competition and adequate technology  is concerned, and not
integration of the busways with other modes, such as the suburban rail and
subway networks, BNDES's evaluation concluded that some of the proposed
technological options were already close to their capacity in the first years of
operation and would become saturated soon thereafter. Also in the investment
budgets submitted, the costs of basic construction inputs were overestimated
and did not reflect that an effort had been made to search for the optimal
design.
*  BNDES also argued that, when compared to traditional financing TO the
public sector, the proposed option would be financially  more costly.The cost of
the proposed scheme , which uses financing  by the private sector to be repaid
by the public sector, would have to include not only the agreed repayment
schedule but also the costs attributed to the risk that the Municipality would
delay or default in its payments.
*  BNDES argues that while the proposed scheme would in the short term
resolve the problem created by the interdiction of financing by BNDES to the
6public sector, in the medium and long term the proposed scheme was going to
increase the transport operating costs.
*  In addition, since this was a contract to provide services with an 8 year term
and not really a full concession in which the winner  assumes all market risks,
the scheme was equivalent to two separate subcontracts: one for the
implementation of the civil works and another exclusively  for operation.
Consequently, there would be little interest on the part of the winners to come
up with solutions for structural problems and to generate other revenues. If it
was not a concession, the private sector was not assuming the market risks,
and most probably the public sector would not obtain the gains in productivity
which it was seeking by transferring the provision of services to the private
sector.
*  BNDES examined the projects but requested very expensive real guarantees
(130% of the investments) from the borrowers. These guarantees could only
come from the personal assets of the directors of the firms, assets of the
private sector consortia or commercial bank security bonds. This made it
almost impossible for the private sector to pursue this financing. Since the
revenues would be collected through a clearing house mechanism, BNDES
did not accept any revenue guarantees.
*  The alternative proposed to BNDES was to use the contracts between the
concessionaires and the SPM as guarantees. This did not work because of the
legal nature of these contracts, which were considered more as management
contracts rather than concessions, and especially because the revenues were
collected by the SPM rather than the operator. This suggested that the
revenues belonged to the SPM and not to the operator.
*  Some say that BNDES being a government institutition was pressured by the
railway lobby not to lend to the bus operators and for political reasons did not
want to lend to projects sponsored by the SPM government. All this is denied
by BNDES which claims that the projects were not feasible from an economic
standpoint and for that reason they would not qualify  for financing. Since this
alternative failed, the SPM proposed to create a Fund (FUNCOR) with its
own budget funds to be used as a counter-guarantee for BNDES financing.
But this attempt did not materialize.
The State of Sao Paulo  Busway Program
21.  In 1983,  the GSSP  determined  that the Sao  Paulo  Metro Company  (Metr6)  would
be responsible  for planning  and implementing  a set of exclusive  intermunicipal  trolleybus
corridors,  which  would  be integrated  with the Sao Paulo  municipal  bus lines  and the State-
owned  rail-based  network.  As part of this mandate,  the Metr6 had the task of
implementing  the first priority  connection  between  Sao Mateus  and Jabaquara,  creating
7a perimetral interconnection ring between the Sao Paulo (Sao Mateus, in the east) Santo
Andre, Sao Bernardo do Campo, Diadema and Sao Paulo (Jabaquara in the south).
22.  The implementation of infrastructure works, acquisition and installation of
equipment, as well as the development of the Operational and Integration Projects, took
place from 1984 to  1987, at which time the responsibility of operation of all State
"intermunicipal" bus services  was delegated to the Metropolitan Urban Transport
Company (Empresa Municipal de Transportes Urbanos - EMTU), also under the GSSP.
Project Rationale
23.  The main objective of the Sao Mateus-Jabaquara corridor is to satisfy an important
lack of public transport supply in the southeastern region of the SPMR, due to a very high
passenger demand between two important regional nodes, which until now were only
served by conventional bus services. The program also attempted to reconcile the needs
of the municipalities  involved by providing a structural transport connection which took
into account land use and physical ,operational, and tariff integration.
24.  The project has two basic premises:
*  to provide an  intermediate capacity public transport service with a design
concept and changes in the road infrastructure to ensure its priority over other
road traffic.  The traffic segregation of the trolleybuses from the rest of the
general traffic had as an objective to allow a greater commercial speed and to
facilitate the control and reliability of supply.
*  to become a factor in inducing a process to reorganize and discipline
conventional bus service in its area of influence.
25.  This corridor project was originally  conceived to satisfy a daily demand of 250,000
passengers, with an operation totally based on electric traction (trolleybuses). However,
due to a need for higher than planned for resources for public investment and a cost-
effectiveness comparison of trolleybuses with diesel buses, the Project was only partially
implemented. As a result of the 188 vehicle fleet in the Sao Mateus-Jabaquara corridor.
only 45 are trolley buses and the rest are diesel.
26.  The operation and maintenance of this corridor is done through operations
contracts with the private sector  companies, while the EMTU is responsible for
management and supervision of services.
27.  The determinant factors in the decision to concession out the trolleybus corridor to
the private sector were:
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The  Sao Mateus-Jabaquara  has an extension of 33km of which 30 km are totally
segregated  busway
Aerial View of the Siio Mateus-Jabaquara  corridor
10*  to reduce the involvement of the GSSP in public transport operations.
*  to reduce the costs to the State (by 30%) in the management of services that
are outsourced.  The State continues with the responsibility of regulating and
monitoring services.
The Sio  Mateus - Jabaquara trolleybus corridor
Physical Characteristics
Length  Terminals  Stops  Electrification
33  km  9 (nove)  55 each way  22.5 km  already
Of which:  Of which:  Or:  km with
30 km in exclusive  (6 with physical  111 both ways  electrification  to be
segregated busway  integration and 4  executed
and 3 km in shared  with physical and
way  tariff integration)
- After about 10 years without being able to complete the corridor as planned,
due to lack of state budgetary resources, this concession to the private sector
would allow the completion of the fleet electrification  which has been
postponed for more than 10 years.
- to allow concession period terms which are longer to make the trolleybus
viable. Since the Brazilian legislation (Law 8666/93) only allows management
contracts for operations with periods not exceeding 6 years, EMTU was
forced to call for new public bids every 6 years to maintain the operation.If
this six-year concession period for management contracts was maintained, the
electrification  of the fleet would become financially  unattractive.
*  This way, EMTU decided that a concession contract for services would allow
longer concession terms and therefore, a depreciation compatible with the
useful life of the transport system based on electric traction.  With that, the
comparative advantage of diesel buses over trolleybuses would be minimized.
28.  In this specific project, the basic difference consists of the investment and
operating costs of a diesel bus and a trolleybus, since the other investments on
infrastructure, such as the segregated right-of-way and part of the electrification,  had
already been done by the State.  Amongst the advantages and reasons which led EMTU to
opt for total electrification of the fleet and return to its original concept for the Sao
Mateus-Jabaquara corridor were:
11*  the emission of pollutants is zero and the noise caused is much less than the
normal noise in urban roads, allowing more comfort to the users and less
degradation in the areas surrounding the corridor. In fact, the famous 9th of
July busway corridor with diesel buses, carrying record volumes above 20,000
pphd is, in retrospect, a failure from the environmental standpoint since it
transformed what was once a beautiful avenue, into an area where only auto
mechanic shops and depots are located.
*  the operating conditions in segregated rights-of-way is favorable to
trolleybuses because they allow acceleration and deceleration which is more
controlled with maximum  speeds which can be limited  to 60km/hour,
improving therefore safety conditions.
Once the advantages of a trolleybus operation were identified, both for the users as well
as for the population who lives close to the busway, EMTU undertook a financial
simulation  to determine the cost increment to be incurred by the concessionaire  by
replacing diesel buses by trolleybuses, all other assumptions being the same. The
evaluation pointed out that the incremental financial  costs to be supported by the
concessionaire with the electrification  of the corridor would be equal to 2.5-2.8% of the
fare revenues.The comparison of the situation with project  (trolleybus fleet) vs. without
project (diesel bus fleet plus existing EMTU fleet), using useful lifes for the diesel buses
and trolley buses of respectively 10 and 20 years yield a internal rate of return of 14% for
the situation with project without accounting for the environmental benefits. Investment
and operating costs per vehicle are given below
29.  Scope of the concession of trolleybus services to the private sector:
Objective of the Concession;
*  operation and maintenance  of the metropolitan corridor (Sao Mateus-
Jabaquara) including total fleet electrification  within five years;
*  maintenance of the road exclusive right-of-way and the aerial network;
*  implementation of the electrification  and operation of the trolley bus system in
a 14 km link between the Diadema (center) municipality  and Sao Paulo,
Brookline, on the banks of the Pinheiros River, near a future train station.
*  acquisition from EMTU-SP, at market prices, defined in the bidding
documents, of the trolleybus fleet in operation (46 vehicles); auxiliary  vehicles,
depots, tools and equipment.
12Ridership Data:
PAYING  PASSENGERS  4.490.176
INTEGRATED  PASSENGERS  1.460.155
OTHERS  419.173
TOTAL  PASSENGERS  (Monthly  6.369.504
Average  for 1995)
N ° OF TRIPS  TAKEN  92.525
LEVEL  OF SERVICE  Average  at peak  hour = 5,4 Passangers/m 2
Average  between  peak  hour  =  3,5
Passengers/m2
MAXIMUM  HEADWAY  20 Minutes
FLEET  46 Trolleybus
120  diesel  buses
23 articulated  diesel  buses
TARIFF  R$ 1,00  (US$1=R$1.06)
Passengers  Transported






13INVESTMENT  COST  (Trolleybus  vs Diesel  Fleet)
-000's  of$SR
TOTAL  COST  FLEET  COST/VEHICLE
Single  Trolley  (Padron  type)  27,748  119  233
Articulated  Trolley  14,382  35  411
Single Bus  (Padron  Type)  14,280  119  120
Artic-ulated  Bus  7,000  35  200
OPERATIONAL  COST PER VEHICLE /YEAR
000'S OF REAIS
Year  1  5  10  15  20
(TROLLEYBUSES)
Single
Operating  cost  103.82  101.11  109.35  110.47  110.47
TOTAL  COST  115.72  115.92  124.17  125.29  117.07
ARTICULATED
Operating  cost  101.63  99.4  112.17  116,11  116.11
TOTAL  COST  120-31  123-31  136.11  140.06  140.06
Existing  E:TUFZeet
Operating  cost  98.33  98.33  98.33  98.33  9S.33
TOTAL  COST  108.67  108.67  108.67  108.67  108.67
DIL:SEL  PADRON
Operating  cost  101.29  104.29  106.97  104.29  106.97
DIEPRECLATION  11.61  11.61  11.61  11.61  11.61
TOTAL  COST  112.89  11l59  118.58  115.91  118.58
DIESELARTICULATEOD
Operating  cost  96.83  101.63  105.91  101.63  105.91
DEPRgCIATJON  18.69  18.69  18.69  18.69  18.69
TOTAL  COST  115.51  120.31  124.60  120.31  124.60
Existing  EIWTUP7eet  98.33  98.33  98.33  98.33  98.33
Operating  cost  10.35  10.35  10.35  10.35  10.35
TOTAL COST  108.67  108.67  108.67  108.67  108.67
(*) OPFRATING  COST  INCLUDES  LABOR,  MATERIALS,  MAINTENANCE
COSTS  AND  ENERGY  AND  FUEL
1  430. Concession period:  20 years
31. Ownership:
infrastructure, including the administrative  installations, parking and vehicle
maintenance areas exclusive right-of-way integration terminals, bus stops and
systems and equipment which already existed continue as  state property.
*  the trolley buses totally depreciated during the concession will be transferred to
the government.  The trolley buses which will not be fully depreciated by the
end of the concession could be acquired by the state for its residual value.
32. Service Specification
the State defines the norms and guidelines for the services to be operated and
these were clearly defined in the bidding documents. The concessionaire
prepares the Operating Plan and submits it for the approval of the EMTU-SP,
which will also be responsible for its enforcement
33. TariffAuthority
*  the State is responsible for setting the tariff and for reviewing it in such a way
as to ensure the economic and financial equilibrium  of the trolleybus system
taking into account its integration with other modes in the SPMR
34. Service Remuneration:
- it will be a revenue for the concessionaire,  the revenues derived from the fares
paid by the user, the revenues resulting from legally accessible advertisement in
the vehicles and other revenues previously approved by the State.
35. Important aspects of the biddingprocess:
*  both national and international consortia were allowed to bid.
*  the concessionaire was allowed to initiate the operation of the corridor with
diesel vehicles, but had, five years after signing the concession contract, the
obligation to have the total fleet composed exclusively  of trolleybuses
•  the bid documents required the proponents to indicate a cash flow for the
twenty years of the concession, considering a 15% of the revenues for
payments to EMTU for the management of the system, administration of
terminals and payment of electrical energy for traction
15*  the winner of the concession had, after signing the contract, to establish a
company with the specific purpose of operating the system
*  the proposals were presented in three envelopes: pre-qualification, technical
proposal and price proposal
36. Selection Criteria:
*  only the pre-qualified firms had their technical proposals opened, based on
technical criteria clearly defined in the bidding documents
*  only proponents whose technical proposals were accepted could participate in
the price proposals
*  the winner of the bid was the proponent who offered the highest percentage of
the gross revenues to the State
37. Results of the Bidding Process
- two consortia and one firm, all local, participated in the bid: Metrobus
Consortium, Metropolitan Transport Consortium, and Passaro Marrom Bus
Company
- the winner, besides the 15% of the gross revenues mentioned above, offered
1.5% of the daily gross revenues towards the acquisition of the assets defined
in the bid and 0.45% of the revenues as a royalty for the concession of the
services. The total gross revenue expected is US$7.5 million per year.
l  The winner was Metropolitan Transport Consortium which established a
specific company for the concession called  METRA- SISTEMA DE
TRANSPORTE METROPOLITANO. METRA started the operation of the
corridor in May 1997 with 22 new trolleybuses acquired with BNDES
(FINAME) financing.
Conclusions
38.  The Sao Paulo Municipality program was quite imaginative and despite its failure
to materialize, it was a noteworthy experience which generated a lot of interest and also
plenty of lessons for future concessions. Some of these lessons are:
*  Brazilian bus private sector operators, who in general are traditional
entrepeneurs, must be taught how to prepare financing plans or at least where
to get the best advice to put together their financial engineering design of the
project. In the case of Sao Paulo Municipality all consortia turned to BNDES
for financing probably because their loan interest rates are lower than those of
commercial banks, but also because the concession was with government.
16Once they were turned down they did not consider other possibilities such as
the International Finance Corporation  or other private sector related
development institutions. One reason could be that the former normally require
federal approval and the process takes time. Neither as the Sao Paulo
Municipality considered the possibility of using the partial risk gurantees of
the World Bank to lower the rates of commercial  bank loans to the private
consortia.
*  In any case, Sao Paulo Municipality should also have undertaken detailed
economic evaluation of the projects, that is,  from the standpoint of the Sao
Paulo Metropolitan Region as a whole, including the impacts on other modes
and systems integration. This analysis  is required by all the development
bilateral and multilateral financial institutions.
*  It seems, that in a situation in which the private operators are paid on the basis
of vehicle-km supplied and in which all revenues are collected by the State
which then pays the operators, the concession contracts or the operating
revenues cannot be easily used as guarantees. This indicates that, prior to
defining the tariff mechanisms, governments should think through the impacts
that they might have on financing, since the revenues collected are often the
best guarantee that can be offered.
*  Finally, it is possible that the market felt that the risks invoved in building and
operating the system outweighed the benefits and that the Sao Paulo and
Brazilian market were not yet prepared to accept such a challenge.
39.  The State of Sao Paulo learned from the Municipality experience and was more
cautious in its concession bidding documents. The concession was for the fill operation
for 20 years but, insofar as investment is concerned, only part of the infrastructure had to
be built, because the other part was already in place. This in itself, allows the winning
consortium to generate revenues using the existing system and helps in reducing the
amount that must be borrowed to complete the fleet electrification and the rest of the
electrification  infrastructure (poles, overhead catenary). The concession was less risky for
the concessionaire,  yet the government was achieving  its objectives of completing an
environmentally  friendly project with the help of the private sector. With this concession
the State was therefore able to overcome a chronic lack of budgetary resources needed to
complete the corridor. Given the length of the period of the concession, a clearly
established tariff review policy and the ownership of traffic revenues, the concessionaire
had less problems in obtaining the financing required to complete the infrastructure and
the fleet electrification. This concession was so far a success and an example to be
followed.
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